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Italian appeal court: a genetic predisposition to
commit murder?
Francesca Forzano*,1, Pascal Borry2, Anne Cambon-Thomsen3, Shirley V Hodgson4, Aad Tibben5,6,
Petrus de Vries7,8, Carla van El9 and Martina Cornel9,10,11
A few months ago, the controversial debate on connection between genetic variants and antisocial behaviour gained renewed
prominence after the sentence of an Italian judge who decided to further reduce the prison sentence of a person convicted of
murder by 1 year – from 9 to 8 years – because he was found to be a carrier of a few genetic variants thought to be associated
with a predisposition to aggressiveness. We discuss the social implication of this view, the lack of evidence of the clinical utility
of this test, and in particular the risks of offering susceptibility testing in the context of legal proceedings.
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Research in behavioural genetics has used molecular genetics
research, linkage and association studies in an attempt to find which
genes might be involved in behavioural phenotypes. In particular,
some studies1–3 have focused on the heritability of ‘increased impul-
sive’ and ‘antisocial’ behaviours and have expanded the debate about
how scientific findings such as these could affect criminal law and
whether such information should mitigate criminal responsibility.4
These questions gained renewed prominence after the sentence of
an Italian judge who decided to further reduce the prison sentence of a
person convicted of murder by 1 year – from 9 to 8 years – because he
was found to be a carrier of a few genetic variants that were thought to
be associated with a predisposition to aggressiveness.5–7
THE CASE
The convicted man was an adult male affected by schizophrenia who
was actively psychotic at the time of the crime, having discontinued
his psychotropic medication against medical advice. He was found
guilty at the first level of judgement and was given a reduced sentence
(9 years) owing to his mental illness. At the appeal court, a new expert
assessment took place, and genetic testing was requested by the
defence. In particular, he was tested for variants within the MAOA,
COMT, SCL6A4 and DRD4 genes. The judge based his sentence on the
fact that the accused was affected by a mental disorder and that,
because of the mental disorder, he was not fully capable of under-
standing the seriousness of his actions. The judge, however, reduced
the sentence from 9 to 8 years, based on the fact that the accused had
tested positive for genetic variants that made him particularly prone to
be aggressive under stressful circumstances and therefore he was even
more vulnerable because of that.
MITIGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
To hold an individual criminally responsible for his actions, prosecu-
tors have to prove not only that this individual committed the
offences, but also that this individual had the required state of mind to
be legally responsible for his acts. Therefore, lawyers of the defence will
often question the criminal responsibility of their client based on the
grounds of temporary or chronic insanity. These grounds will need the
assessment of forensic psychiatrists. Worldwide sentencing guidelines
for judges authorize punishment mitigations for offenders suffering
from a reduced mental capacity;8 as a consequence, these criminal
offenders might be subjected to compulsory confinement or hospita-
lization in psychiatric institution for treatment. According to Lewis,8
many judges may be reluctant to categorize a genetic predisposition
for violence as a ‘mental impairment’, but also advance that this might
‘serve the broad principle of justice that punishment of a crime be
proportional to one’s blameworthiness’.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS WEAK
In the case we are discussing, the offender had received a reduced
punishment based on his mental disorder. However, further reduction of
his punishment based on the supposed establishment of a genetic basis
conferring increased risks for violent behaviour raises various concerns.
Given the state of the art in genetics, the possibility of using genetic
variants to evaluate the actual mental capacity of a person at a given
time is far from being established. Presently, genetic variants associated
with schizophrenia do not add to the evaluation of the phenotype
itself. We do not doubt that the physicians who reported on the forensic
tests in this case operated in the most responsible way; however,
scientists might have diversified opinions on the real predictive value
and impact of these genetic variants. Little is known about the
interactions with other possible, still unknown genetic variants and
with the environmental factors that undoubtedly have a role in any
behaviour. We believe that the specific context in which those analyses
have been applied in itself makes these complex genetic evaluations
especially prone to misinterpretations. The most questionable issue is
the decision to request a susceptibility testing in the context of the legal
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proceedings. The vast majority of these tests, if not all, are still purely
research-based and have not received any formal evaluation in terms of
clinical validity and utility. In our opinion, no susceptibility test should
as yet be used in forensic or other judicial settings. The use of genetic
tests in forensic contexts should be restricted to tests with proven clinical
utility for the diagnosis of a disease relevant to the case judged.
NOT PROBABILITIES BUT DIAGNOSIS
A person should be judged on the basis of his actual condition
and mental capacity at the moment of the act, independent of any
theoretical predisposition to develop some disease or inappropriate
behaviour – even assuming that there is really a link between abnormal
behaviour and specific genetic variants. An individual should be
judged on the basis of evidence-based information and not on the
basis of probability interpretation. From the published data we know
on the case, there was sufficient proof of evidence for the mental
disorder of the accused, as he was actually suffering from schizo-
phrenia and was acutely psychotic at the time of the crime, which was
all determined on clinical grounds. We do not think that the possible
aetiology of such a condition should make a difference to the
evaluation of incapacity, but we do consider that the decision should
be based on the objective nature and degree of the disorder, which
may be independent of the genetic variants tested.
IMPACT OF GENETIC INFORMATION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIETY
Although genetic susceptibility information (as in the case for violence
and aggression) has a probabilistic nature, this type of information often
tends to be interpreted with a sense of determinism and by reduction of
an individual to a ‘genomic metaphysics’.9 It is crucial to avoid simplistic
causal relations between genetic variants associated with violence or
aggression and actual violent or aggressive behaviour. Whereas some
people showing more aggressive or violent behaviour might have these
particular gene variants, others will have the same variants despite being
perfectly law-abiding citizens. It should be clear that there is no such
thing as a ‘criminal gene’. We should be aware that labelling individuals
with a ‘criminal gene’ also leads to identifying them as being a risk to
society. This type of stigmatization, based on weak evidence, is
unacceptable. In addition, we believe that an over-emphasis on the
role of genes in criminal behaviour might lead either to over-justifica-
tion or to over-punishment – according to potentially differing inter-
pretations. If the presence of susceptibility is interpreted as decreased
responsibility, punishment might be lower. However, if citizens should
be protected more against criminals who are more prone to recurrent
crime, punishment might be higher. Both these standpoints would not
have any rationale or guidance with current scientific evidence. We are
particularly worried that the recent ruling, as well as similar ones that
may have been previously deliberated, might constitute a dangerous
precedent to which it will be possible to appeal in the future.
INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM
According to some social workers and legal professionals interviewed
on this topic,4 the use of genetic susceptibility tests could be
incompatible with a basic principle of the criminal justice system.
Some practitioners believed that this could be considered as an
infringement of the notion of presumption of innocence. As expressed
by a participant: ‘That’s the other point isn’t it, it’s going to change the
whole of, instead of innocent until proven guilty, you’re guilty because
you’ve got it. [¼the increased risk]’.4 Therefore, it could as well be
considered as an infringement of one’s right to a fair trial. Moreover,
participants envisaged that claims about genetic susceptibility for
violence or aggressiveness could have implications for civil law as
well. For example, it could inform the court’s decisions with regard to
the custody of children or affect decisions with regard to a minor’s
contact with a parent or family member.4
CONCLUSION
There is no scientific support to declare that gene variants, claimed to
predispose to aggression, would make the carriers incapable of
repressing an aggressive behaviour and thus unable to choose appro-
priate socially acceptable behaviours.
The context of this case made also the authors reflect on the
expression ‘mutation responsible for a disease’ too often used by
geneticists themselves, mostly in cases wherein a gene variant is the
known cause of a disease. As a matter of fact, a gene never exerts any
effect in terms of ‘responsibility’, and this word from a philosophical
and legal register10 should not be used to describe biological mechan-
isms. There is a danger in using words that attribute to biology roles
related to responsibility. The case discussed above may also underline
the importance of words used by professionals to designate the effects
of genes. When a judge is looking for responsibility and when
geneticists themselves express the effect of genes in terms of respon-
sibility, some confusion can be expected.
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